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and drivers of corporate political strategizing. Path dependencies in corporate
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recognition of policy issues and the interpretation of the salience of these
issues to corporate interests by senior executives within the firm. Thus, the
article argues that institutional features of competitive environments precipi-
tate in processes of identity building and preference formation and are repro-
duced through organizational routines and practices within the firm.
The contribution of this article to management literature is twofold.
First, building on and extending existing analytical models (Hillman &
Hitt, 1999; Schuler & Rehbein, 1997), firm-internal institutionalization
processes are isolated and identified as central categories in examining the
institutional embeddedness of corporate political action. Second, by focus-
ing on processes of identity building and preference formation, the article
frames questions of corporate political action in terms of broad sociologi-
cal and sociopsychological theories. In doing so, the article takes on two
research suggestions that have been put forward in recent literature reviews
surveying the development of corporate political action research, namely, to
base the analysis of corporate political behavior on fundamental insights
from social science theories (Getz, 2002) and to focus on managerial
preferences and decision making as a particularly relevant research topic
(Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 2004, p. 851).
The argument of the article follows in three steps. First, corporate political
action literature is discussed to argue that corporate political behavior is con-
ditioned by institutional characteristics of competitive environments and
structured by the organization of strategic decision making within the firm.
Second, basic insights from structuration theory are used to conceptualize
firm-internal institutionalization processes in relation to the formation of
actors’ identities and preferences. Third, the article draws on social identity
theory to explore the relation between corporate identities and preferences on
the one hand and, on the other hand, the identities and preferences of individ-
ual executives within the firm. This leads to several propositions about the
relations between actors’ knowledgeability and path dependencies in man-
agerial routines. These propositions can be developed into testable hypothe-
ses for systematically examining processes of identity building and preference
formation in corporate political strategizing. Further research questions that
follow from this argument are discussed in the last section of the article.
Corporate Political Action
Competitive strategies of business firms are institutionally embedded
in different market structures and political and regulatory arrangements
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(Granovetter, 1985). Because of this embeddedness, the involvement of
firms in political decision making varies over time and across markets
(Aggarwal, 2001; Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Griffin, 2005; Hadjikhani &
Ghauri, 2001). Corporate political strategies can be used by the firm to
change the rules of competition and to try and improve its market position
(Mahon & McGowan, 1998). Corporate political actions thus can be
understood as institutional strategies that firms can use to realize opportu-
nities and create comparative advantage (Lawrence, 1999). There are two
strategy problems associated with this. First, effective political strategiz-
ing depends on the ability of the firm to recognize context-specific oppor-
tunities to influence public decision making (Keillor, Pettijohn, & Bashaw,
2000). Firms must monitor their environment, recognize policy issues, and
assess the salience of these issues relative to their corporate interests.
Second, next to recognizing opportunities, the firm must solve the strategy
problem of how to integrate its political activities with its market strategies
(Baron, 1995). Firms must choose between possible strategies toward
public authorities and decide on how to implement them to further their
corporate interests.
The choice problem associated to corporate political strategizing has
been recognized in the management literature. Hillman and Hitt (1999) put
forward a process model of corporate political strategy. In this model, firms
choose between transactional or relational approaches toward public author-
ities and may adopt three different strategies to pursue their policy interests.
Firms may provide information to public officials, use financial means
to realize political influence, or adopt constituency-building strategies to
organize pressure on public decision making. Through these choices for
approaches and strategies, Hillman and Hitt argued, firms may adapt their
political activities to different environments in ways that best serve their
interests.
For instance, in a corporatist environment characterized by relatively
high levels of market regulation and the existence of formal structures for
business–government interaction, firms are likely to adopt a transactional
approach, investing in recurrent interactions with public decision makers
(Getz, 1997, p. 50). In a context of formalized business–government inter-
actions, not taking part in the system of exchanging information, mediating
interests and supporting the creation of public policy would prevent firms
from realizing their interests through political means.
In a similar fashion, characteristics of parliamentary systems will
require firms to adapt their political strategies. Hillman and Keim (1995),
for instance, argued that in the United States, given the country’s political
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culture and electoral system, firms are more likely to be overtly political
when interacting with government. In addition, the use of financial incen-
tive strategies—such as in the context of political action committees—is
common in a U.S. context (Lord, 2003; Mitchell, Hansen, & Jepsen, 1997).
However, these strategies may not be as effective elsewhere. This is illus-
trated by corporate lobbying in the European Union (EU; Calingaert, 1993).
In the political system of the EU, providing information in many ways is
the only reliable strategy for acquiring access to public decision makers
(Bouwen, 2002). The strategy problem in EU lobbying does not so much
concern the question of which strategies to use but rather the question of
how and when to use information strategies (Taminiau & Wilts, 2006). In
addition, and regardless of their size and economic importance, realizing
influence on EU policy making in most cases requires firms to join forces
and adopt collective strategies (Beyers, 2004; Greenwood, 1997). This
makes constituency-building strategies through industry associations more
important and illustrates that the institutional organization of business–
government interaction in the EU for most firms involves a collective action
problem.
Engaging in political action thus means that firms must carefully moni-
tor their environment to find ways to translate their economic interests into
aims and goals of corporate political action. Firms differ in the way they
solve this strategy problem. Some firms are better able than others to orga-
nize their internal decision-making process effectively to cope with the dif-
ferent and possibly contradictory requirements imposed on their strategies
when they are moving through different competitive environments (Griffin
& Dunn, 2004). Other firms will achieve more efficiency in coordinating
their activities and strategy decisions across their organization (Whitley,
2003). Still others will have information mechanisms in place that allow
them to be better informed about political developments and able to antic-
ipate more quickly on changing circumstances and/or policy initiatives
(Hadjikhani & Ghauri, 2001). There will also be firms that, compared to
their rivals, control more relevant resources such as network contacts
or forms of political capital (Oberman, 1993). Finally, some firms will be
more motivated to monitor their political environment for opportunities to
realize competitive advantage (Yoffie & Bergenstein, 1987), where others
may perceive political developments not as an opportunity but instead as a
threat to their corporate interests (Baysinger, 1984).
Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) process model of corporate political strategy
thus points to the importance of strategic-choice and firm-internal deci-
sion making. The firm-internal dimension of corporate political strategy is of
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central importance in Schuler and Rehbein’s (1997) filter model of corpo-
rate political action. Schuler and Rehbein argued that the influence of exter-
nal characteristics such as regulatory pressures and industrial organization
are mediated by the firm’s organizational structures, resources, and compe-
tencies. Firms need to control resources such as relational skills and
political–administrative expertise to be able to realize influence on public
decision making (Dahan, 2005). However, in addition to this, Schuler and
Rehbein (1997, p. 126) point out that “information, beliefs and aspiration
levels” of the firm structure the use of these resources. Allocation decisions
by managers are made based on cost–benefit analyses, and these underlie
decisions to develop political strategies (McWilliams, Van Fleet, & Cory,
2002). It follows that resource availability alone cannot explain corporate
political behavior but that decision-making routines play an important role
in this as well.
The idea that the firm-internal dimension, in particular, knowledge,
practices, and routines, conditions corporate political activities goes back to
Cyert and March’s behavioral theory of the firm. Concentrating on eco-
nomic choice and rationality, in this approach the dynamics of corporate
decision making are central. For instance, March (1962) defined the firm as
a set of political coalitions between firm members and uses this definition
to argue that different sorts of coalitions will develop within different firms.
Hence, firms will vary in terms of the effectiveness of their strategic deci-
sion making, and they are likely to display different strategic behaviors.
Because it focuses on the firm-internal process of decision making, the
behavioral theory of the firm includes organizational cultures and routines
and managers’ attitudes, personal preferences, and ambitions into the analysis
of corporate political behavior (Hart, 2004). These attitudes, preferences,
and ambitions are reflected in the firm’s choices for corporate political
strategies.
The discussion in this section thus leads to two observations that are rel-
evant to the research question of this article. First, Hillman and Hitt’s
(1999) process model of corporate political strategy points to the impor-
tance of strategic choice and managerial decision making. Choices for
corporate political strategies and their adjustment to institutional features
of competitive environments are actively shaped within the firm. Second,
Schuler and Rehbein’s (1997) filter model of corporate political action
leads to the recognition that organizational practices and routines structure
processes of strategic choice and decision making. The routines and prac-
tices of managerial decision making condition the way choices for corpo-
rate political strategies are shaped.
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Routines and Practices
The institutional embeddedness of organizational practices can be ana-
lyzed using basic insights from structuration theory. Giddens’s (1984)
theory of structuration focuses on “social practices ordered across time and
space” (p. 3). This abstract principle translates into a concrete research
interest into routines and patterns in sequences of social action, taking place
in specific institutional contexts (Barley & Tolbert, 1997). This pertains to
corporate strategy in two related ways. First, the firm is a corporate actor,
and its interactions with other organizations are embedded in institutional
structures—the structures of markets and of nonmarket environments
(Boddewyn, 2003). Second, firm-internal decision making about corporate
strategy is a sequence of social action itself and, therefore, is embedded
in institutional structures within the firm—for example, the structures of
decision-making routines and managerial practices (Fligstein, 1990).
Analyzing corporate political action, therefore, requires two different foci:
one on interorganizational relations and linkages, the other on the firm-
internal strategizing process.
To overcome the dualism between structure and agency, Giddens (1984,
p. 25) used the concept of the duality of structure. This concept denotes that
structure is a condition for action and the outcome of action. Because envi-
ronments are structured and do not change at random, actors are able to
anticipate developments, perceive opportunities, and develop strategies to
realize these opportunities. This is the enabling aspect of structure. At the
same time, structure has a constraining aspect. Because environments are
structured, not everything is possible all the time. Actors are faced with
rules and with resource limitations that combine to limit their range of fea-
sible options (Giddens, 1979, pp. 68-69). Not all aims and goals of strate-
gic action will be deemed equally feasible by actors, and hence in given
circumstances some strategic choices are more likely than others.
Corporate strategy is intentional action by firms and as such underlies
the duality of structure (Pozzebon, 2004). This means that market structures
and the institutional characteristics of nonmarket environments make cor-
porate strategy possible in some directions, while constraining it in others;
that is, given institutional circumstances some strategies and tactics are
more probable than others. The existence of established practices and ways
of conduct structures changes in interorganizational relations (Marchington
& Vincent, 2004). These relations are institutionally integrated and, there-
fore, can only change in a path-dependent manner. For instance, corporate
actions are partly structured by notions of what legitimate and generally
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acceptable business action is (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). This constrains business
action as not all strategic choices will be possible—for instance, the choice
to bribe government officials or to deceive the company’s shareholders.
However, at the same time this enables the firm to interact with organiza-
tions such as social pressure groups, nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), public authorities, and government agencies. In interacting with
these organizations, firms may seek to enhance the legitimacy of their oper-
ations in ways that support their performance and survival (Oliver, 1997).
An important observation of structuration theory is that actors are knowl-
edgeable and motivated; that is, that they are able to reflect on the reasons
and circumstances of their interactions with others (Giddens, 1979, chap. 2).
Actors—either explicitly of tacitly—hold knowledge about the conditions
and consequences of their actions. This holds a fortiori for corporate strat-
egy as strategizing is a conscious, or cognitive, process per se. Developing
and implementing strategies requires firms to constantly monitor their envi-
ronment, to reflect on the use of particular tactics to achieve desired out-
comes, and to keep a close eye on their rivals’ actions—which may, for
instance, compete with the firm for influence on public decision making.
Using structuration theory to conceptualize corporate political strategiz-
ing leads to the conclusion that firms are able to develop strategies because
they are knowledgeable about the rules and resources that they can use to
realize their corporate interests. This holds for established firms and for
new business ventures (Jack & Anderson, 2002). It is because firms are
embedded in various market and nonmarket structures that they can seek
and realize opportunities—that they can strategize for opportunities. For
instance, without the emergence of market prices firms would not be able
to calculate and compare the costs and benefits of resource allocation deci-
sions; without the existence of unambiguous legal rules, the firm would not
be in a position to know whether and when it complies to the law; without
the establishment of social norms, the firm could not assess whether its
strategies are socially responsible or not; and without the existence of reg-
ulatory arrangements, the firm would not be able to recognize opportunities
to further its economic interests through political action.
Firms’ knowledge about the institutional characteristics of their compet-
itive environments structures corporate strategizing toward other organiza-
tions such as rivals, collective interest associations, regulatory authorities,
or government agencies. Their interactions with these organizations yield
concrete incentives for firms to strive for particular goals and offer them
specific opportunities for realizing their corporate interests. In the context
of the institutional organization of their market and nonmarket environment,
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therefore, firms will develop different understandings of what their corpo-
rate goals and interests should be and of how these goals and interests can
best be realized (Mayntz, 1997). These different understandings constitute
the firm’s perceived self-interest and become manifest in the corporate pref-
erences revealed by their choices for certain strategies and tactics to try and
influence public decision making.
In terms of Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) process model of corporate polit-
ical strategy, firms may choose different paths through the decision-tree
model of relational and transactional approaches and information, financial,
and constituency-building strategies. However, firms can only choose these
paths when decision makers within the firm know which policy outcomes
to prefer. Senior management must know which political solutions will best
fit their firm’s corporate interests, and this information is necessary to make
adequate resource allocation decisions (Schuler & Rehbein, 1997). The
choices underlying corporate political strategizing can only be made based
on preferences that allow the firm to differentiate between desired out-
comes and realized outcomes, between the intended and unintended out-
comes of their attempts to influence public decision making. Firms can
only develop these preferences with knowledge about their market and non-
market environments and based on some form of self-understanding of
their role toward the policy process. Corporate political strategizing, that is,
involves choice. These choices can only be made based on preferences to
distinguish between feasible strategic options in the light of desired out-
comes. This means that corporate political strategizing is structured by two
related processes of identity building and preference formation.
Identities and Preferences
Processes of identity building and preference formation are of central
concern in social identity theory (Brown, 2000). Work in this field has
demonstrated the central importance of identity in the way social relations
among organizations and within organizations are structured. Identity is
defined as continuous self-categorization; it combines actors’ beliefs,
norms, and interests; it structures the set of feasible options in the actor’s
solution set and thereby enables the actor to strategize; it is a social struc-
ture because it is developed, reproduced, and changed in ongoing social
relations between actors; and it is an institutional feature because, given
its relational nature, it cannot be changed at will and acts as a constraint to
stabilize expectations of interaction partners.
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Identities enable strategic behavior because they make courses of action
relatively predictable, thus encouraging commitment, reducing uncertainty,
and allowing actors to build up knowledge about the conditions and conse-
quences of their actions. At the same time, identity building constrains
these actions because it creates path dependencies by limiting the range of
feasible options that actors may choose from—or are most probable to
choose from (Howard-Grenville, 2005). It is in terms of their identity that
actors perceive opportunities and threats, set goals for strategic behavior,
assess the appropriateness of particular strategies and tactics, and evaluate
the intended and unintended outcomes of their actions (Scharpf, 1997,
p. 65). Applied to questions of corporate political strategy, it is the identities
of firms that structure their perception of opportunities associated to polit-
ical action and that condition their choices for particular approaches and
strategies to realize influence on public decision making.
There are two ways, then, in which the concept of social identity is rel-
evant to the study of corporate political action. First, identity reflects the
“central character” of the firm, distinguishes the firm from its competitors,
and expresses the continuity in corporate actions over time (Albert &
Whetten, 1985, p. 265). This directly pertains to the identities that firms
build up when interacting with public authorities and other organizations in
their regulatory and political environment. When interacting with these
organizations, firms cannot fall back on market activities to express their
preferences and, therefore, in many ways must rely on their reputation and
credentials as reliable interaction partners. Second, identity is a “motivator
and product” of managerial behavior (Haslam, Postmes, & Ellemers, 2003,
p. 359). Managers’ perception of their organization and their interpretation
of corporate interests shape their behavior and are expressed in the strate-
gizing process taking place within the firm (Meyer, Tsui, & Hinnings,
1993). This, too, is relevant to questions of corporate political action. In the
case of small firms, for instance, the personal outlook of the CEO greatly
influences the firm’s political actions (Cook & Barry, 1995). Also in larger
firms the role of individual managers (Wilson & Millman, 2003) and the
composition of boards of directors and top management teams affect cor-
porate political behavior (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2003).
Identity is a social construct because the process in which it emerges
is relational (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). Identities, collective and individual,
result from comparisons that actors continuously make with others in the
case of ongoing—or recursive (Barley & Tolbert, 1997)—interactions. It is
through two interaction processes, therefore, the one within the firm (Hatch
& Schultz, 2002), the other between the firm and its stakeholders (Scott &
Wilts / Corporate Political Strategizing 449
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on May 25, 2011bas.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Lane, 2000), that organizational identities are formed and processes of
identification take place. This means that the organization, frequency, and
intensity of the firm’s interactions with other organizations structure the
firm’s understanding of its role toward the policy process and its perception
of feasible options to realize the opportunities associated to political action.
At the same time, the organization, frequency, and intensity of interactions
between managers within the firm affect the extent to which corporate iden-
tities structure managerial decision making regarding the salience of policy
issues and the way the firm should respond to these issues.
Introducing notions of identity building and, closely related to this, of
preference formation enables us to isolate firm-internal institutionalization
processes as explanatory factors in examining corporate political behavior.
As composite actors, made up of networks of interaction among organiza-
tion members, firms have a capacity for strategic action that goes beyond
that of individual managers in their decision-making structures (Mayntz &
Scharpf, 1995). At the same time, firms depend on interaction with other
organizations to realize their strategic goals and objectives. These can be
cooperation partners or rivals; however, in either case the firm must adjust
its political strategies to the activities of other organizations operating in its
policy environment.
Analytically, this means there are two interaction processes that struc-
ture corporate political action (Figure 1). First, interaction between senior
managers in the firm’s decision-making structure must lead to the recogni-
tion of policy issues and their salience to corporate interests. Management
must also recognize preferred ways of acting on those issues to realize
opportunities associated with political action. Second, tactics and strategies
aimed at realizing these opportunities need to be implemented through
interaction between the firm and other organizations—such as competitors,
trade associations, regulatory agencies, or government authorities. Interactions
with these organizations on its turn will affect the reputation and corporate
identity of the firm, and this will structure subsequent steps of corporate
political strategizing within the firm.
Examining Corporate Political Strategizing
Thus far, the article has argued that processes of identity building and
preference formation are institutional processes that underlie corporate
political strategizing. To start examining empirically how identities and
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preferences structure the political strategy choices of firms, this section
specifies 12 propositions. These propositions address the constraining and
enabling aspects of identities and preferences. They focus on path depen-
dencies in the development of identities and preferences and on how these
path dependencies relate to actors’ knowledgeability. Extending the argu-
ment of the previous sections, the propositions respectively refer to corpo-
rate identities, managerial identities, and decision-making preferences in
corporate political strategizing. This gives rise to a number of empirical
research questions that are relevant when developing the propositions of
this article into testable hypotheses. These further research questions are
discussed in the last section of the article.
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Corporate Political Identities
Effective corporate political strategizing requires the firm to develop
a political identity, an understanding of itself as an actor that is able
to achieve competitive goals through political means. Firms need to learn
to see themselves as actors with political interests before they are able to
establish preferred ways of realizing the opportunities associated to politi-
cal action. A corporate political identity is a prerequisite for developing the
policy preferences without which corporate political strategizing is not pos-
sible. At the same time, the political identity of the firm is an outcome of
its political actions. The firm can only implement its political tactics and
strategies through patterned interaction with other organizations in its pol-
icy environment, and it is through this process that corporate political iden-
tities are formed and reproduced.
A first factor explaining corporate political behavior, therefore, is the
corporate political identity of the firm. Its identity will make the firm’s
actions more or less predictable. This stabilizes the expectations that other
organizations such as public authorities and government agencies may have
about how and when the firm may try to achieve influence on public deci-
sion making. In the light of these expectations, firms may develop into reli-
able interaction partners in policy networks (cf. Coen, 1997). In addition,
for instance, firms may be recognized by their rivals as reliable or trust-
worthy interaction partners when developing collective political strategies—
such as when rivals need to mutually adjust their interests within business
associations (Knoke, 1990). It follows that the more the firm is embedded in
networks of interactions with these other organizations and the more its
political actions are entrenched in the context of interorganizational relations
and linkages, the more structured—in the constraining and the enabling
sense—the firm’s room for maneuvering in its policy environment will be
(see Lamberg, Skippari, Eloranta, & Mäkinen, 2004).
An important analytical dimension of corporate political action, there-
fore, is the information that other organizations such as rivals, public
authorities, and government agencies have about the firm’s past behavior.
Related to this, a second analytical dimension is the extent to which the
firm may attempt to change the expectations that other organizations have
about its behavior and intent. Corporate political strategizing, after all,
underlies the duality of structure. This means that strategic choices of the
firm are conditioned, not determined by expectations of other organizations
in its policy environment. Despite being institutionally embedded, and
despite its political strategizing being subject to path dependencies, the firm
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has room for agency. The firm may try and change its embeddedness in its
policy environment. The firm may build new relations with other organiza-
tions, it may try and change existing relations, and it may strive to change
the attitudes and expectations that other organizations have toward it.
This leads to four propositions that capture the tension between the path
dependencies inherent to the development of corporate political identities
and, on the other hand, the knowledge of the firm about these dependencies,
on the basis of which it can strategize and try and change its network
of interorganizational relations and linkages with others operating in its
policy environment.
Proposition 1a: The more the firm’s political strategies are embedded in networks
of interorganizational relations and linkages, the more established the corporate
political identity of the firm will be.
Proposition 1b: The more the firm’s political strategies are embedded in networks
of interorganizational relations and linkages, the more the firm’s feasible set of
policy options will be structured by the expectations of other organizations in its
policy environment.
Proposition 1c: The more the firm’s political strategies are embedded in networks
of interorganizational relations and linkages, the better the firm will be informed
about other organizations’ goals and objectives.
Proposition 1d: The more the firm’s political strategies are embedded in networks
of interorganizational relations and linkages, the better the firm will be able to
decide whether to adjust to or try and change the expectations of other organi-
zations in its policy environment.
A first focus in examining corporate political action along the lines sug-
gested in this article, then, is on the expectations that other organizations
have about the firm’s behavior and, second, on the attempts of the firm to
adjust to or try and change these expectations; that is, examining corporate
political action should start with mapping out the firm’s network of interor-
ganizational relations and linkages, the durability of these relations and
linkages, and the knowledgeability of other organizations about the politi-
cal strategies of the firm. Closely related to this, examining the firm’s polit-
ical activities needs to include the extent to which—and the manner in
which—the firm may strive to change its external relations and manage
other organizations’ expectations. This includes the way the firm develops
cooperative or competitive strategies toward its rivals. Implied by this is
that analyzing corporate political action should not be restricted to examin-
ing interactions between the firm and public authorities and government
agencies.
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Managerial Identities
Individual managers within firms will varyingly identify with their orga-
nization, and this is reflected in their different behaviors and choices (Fiol,
1991).1 Identification within the firm results from interaction between
senior executives, who are involved in the formation of corporate strategy
toward organizations such as rivals, trade associations, public authorities,
government agencies, and so on. To represent their corporate interests
toward these other organizations, managers need to identify with the goals
and objectives of their company. Individual perceptions of corporate strat-
egy are an important aspect of strategy formation within firms because one
of the main tasks of management is to define organizational characteristics
and to uphold the corporate identity of the firm (Albert & Whetten, 1985).
Depending on organizational characteristics, processes of identification
will result in different degrees of congruence between individual and col-
lective identities (Foreman & Whetten, 2002). This structures managers’
commitment to corporate goals and priorities and conditions the beliefs and
cognitive orientations they bring into managerial decision making about
approaches and strategies of corporate political action. The concepts of
identity and identification refer to institutionalization processes in relation
to the beliefs, commitment, and cognitive capacities of managers. These
concepts thus capture the basic tension between structure and agency
within the firm, between organizational context and managerial decision
making (Albert, Ashforth, & Dutton, 2000).
Managers’ identities and identification processes within the firm structure
corporate political strategizing. The extent to which managers identify with
the corporate identity of their company may differ and will affect managers’
actions, their corporate leadership, and the way they organize collaborative
and subordinate relations within the firm (Svenningsson & Alvesson, 2003).
Managerial identities thus structure political strategy decisions. They also
affect the way managers connect their choices for political strategies with
managerial decision making elsewhere in the firm. Identities are important in
managerial behavior and affect how group relations within firms are formed
and information exchanges organized. This means that the integration of, for
instance, market strategies and political strategies within managerial decision
making is structured by identities and identification processes.
Identification processes within the firm may produce tensions between
corporate identities and individual identities. These tensions may be construc-
tive when they stimulate managers to be creative and ambitious (Hamel &
Prahalad, 1993). However, they may also lead to conflict and prevent managers
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from developing new ideas about preferred goals and means in corporate
political strategizing. The degree to which managers identify with their
firm’s political identity, therefore, will affect corporate political behavior.
This leads to the following propositions:
Proposition 2a: The stronger managers identify with their firm’s corporate political
identity, the more managers’ set of feasible policy options in political strategiz-
ing will be structured by corporate political interests.
Proposition 2b: The stronger managers identify with their firm’s corporate political
identity, the more commitment to and cognitive orientation toward their firm’s
political goals and objectives they will have.
Proposition 2c: The stronger managers identify with their firm’s corporate political iden-
tity, the more managerial identities in corporate political strategizing will be shared.
Proposition 2d: The stronger managers identify with their firm’s corporate political
identity, the more support political strategy decisions will have within the firm.
Next to interorganizational relations and linkages, examining corporate
political behavior along the lines of the argument of this article, then, should
focus on intraorganizational exchanges, that is, firm-internal information
flows, on the development of commitment and cognitive orientations of man-
agers, on the role of trust and legitimacy in managerial decision making, and
on leadership styles and modes of conflict resolution in corporate political
strategizing. Examining these factors in relation to processes of identity
building and preference formation can explain why, under similar circum-
stances, firms’ corporate political behavior nevertheless may differ.
Corporate Policy Preferences
In their capacity as actors, firms develop trajectories and histories that
structure their future actions and that differentiate them from each other
(Albert & Whetten, 1985). Firms will differ internally, that is, they will
understand themselves differently, and they will perceive different opportu-
nities for competing or cooperating with others to achieve their goals and
objectives through political action. This means that in different competitive
environments, and at various points in time, firms will develop different
preferences for certain political strategies and policy involvement activities
(Martin, 1995). Depending on the firm’s self-understanding toward the
policy process and its preferred ways of realizing opportunities associated
to political action, firms will be varyingly inclined to choose between, for
instance, relational and transactional approaches when engaging in political
Wilts / Corporate Political Strategizing 455
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on May 25, 2011bas.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
action. Based also on their political identity and its related preferences, firms
will try to combine various tactics and strategies so that empirical combina-
tions between generic approaches to corporate political strategy will emerge
in the handling of the firm’s public affairs and its political relations.
Again referring to Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) process model of corporate
political strategy, firms will develop different preferences for relational
and transactional approaches and information, financial, and constituency-
building strategies. However, the range of feasible options in shaping policy
preferences within the firm is limited, or structured (Mayntz, 1997, p. 176).
Firms are not free to choose their preferences. Instead, these preferences are
related to their corporate identities and shaped in managerial decision
making. The recognition of policy issues and the interpretation of their
salience to corporate interests is the result of interaction between the firm’s
senior executives. These managers make allocation decisions. They balance
the costs of developing particular political strategies against the expected
contribution of these strategies to the firm’s performance and survival.
Senior managers control the resources that are necessary for developing
political strategies next to, and in support of, the firm’s market strategies.
Managerial allocation decisions translate directly into strategic choices
and hence into corporate strategy. Developing political strategies requires
managers to reach agreement on the relevance of political strategies. Issues
that emerge in the firm’s policy environment need to be “collectively rec-
ognized” as salient to the firm’s interests (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991,
p. 518). Identities shape the recognition of issues and the assessment of issue
salience in corporate political strategizing; however, it is decision-making
routines that determine how the firm will act on the recognition of salient
issues. It is through the firm’s routines and decision-making procedures that
preferences for corporate political strategy are formed. This leads to the
third set of propositions of this article:
Proposition 3a: The more corporate political strategizing occurs in established rou-
tines and decision-making procedures, the more path dependent the formation of
the firm’s policy preferences will be.
Proposition 3b: The more corporate political strategizing occurs in established rou-
tines and decision-making procedures, the more the set of feasible options in
political strategizing will be organized around collectively recognized issues.
Proposition 3c: The more corporate political strategizing occurs in established rou-
tines and decision-making procedures, the more readily senior managers will
recognize the salience of policy issues.
Proposition 3d: The more corporate political strategizing occurs in established
routines and decision-making procedures, the more consistency there will be in
managers’ political strategy choices.
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Managers’ choices for particular approaches and strategies to influence
public policy reveal the firm’s policy preferences. These preferences are
related to the political identity of the firm and the extent to which senior
managers identify with and categorize themselves in terms of a corporate
political identity. Firm-internal exchanges and, in particular, routines and
decision-making procedures, structure the process in which corporate pref-
erences for policy outcomes are shaped. It is within these exchanges that the
institutional embeddedness of corporate political strategizing is expressed.
Identities and Strategic Options
Becoming part of policy networks and establishing regular contacts with
political decision makers stimulates firms to further engage in corporate
political action (Hansen & Mitchell, 2000). In the process, firms develop
network relations and knowledge that enable them to be better informed
about political developments and that allow them to actually influence pol-
icy decision making. Firms will be better able to understand their interests
and make out their preferences when they are more actively involved in cor-
porate political activities. In turn, a more active policy involvement will
contribute positively to the ability of the firm to recognize and prioritize
opportunities associated to political action. The more actively firms are
involved in political activities, therefore, the more readily they will recog-
nize issues and the better they will be able to develop a recognizable cor-
porate political identity and the more consistent the related set of their
policy preferences will be. This will feed back positively on the firm’s per-
formance but can also lock the firm into particular ways of doing things,
creating established routines and limiting its room for maneuvering in the
process. Structural features of the economic and political environment of
firms, however, do not directly determine the choice for particular political
tactics and strategies. Firm-internal institutionalization processes are an
intermediating structure in the development of corporate political strate-
gies. Identification processes and, related to this, routines and decision-
making procedures within the firm drive the corporate political strategizing
process and hence help explain variation in corporate political behavior.
The propositions about processes of identity building and preference
formation as developed in this section connect to the basic premise of
structuration theory, namely, that social practices are ordered sequences of
subsequent interactions that are constrained and enabled by institutional
structures. Examining corporate political strategizing using the proposi-
tions will help to explain variation in corporate political behavior across
institutional settings and over time.2 This will contribute to systematically
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and comparatively examining the dynamics of corporate political strategizing.
However, determining how and when corporate political strategizing is
indeed enabled or constrained by processes of identity building and prefer-
ence formation is an empirical research question. Structure is condition and
outcome of action, and the relative impact of its constraining and enabling
aspects can only be observed empirically.
Further Questions
The previous sections of this article argued that institutional features of
the policy environment of the firm precipitate in its organizational routines
and decision-making practices and structure the development of corporate
political identities and policy preferences. The formation of policy prefer-
ences is central to the analysis of corporate political action because it is
only based on these preferences that firms can choose between different
approaches and strategies to influence public decision making. The previ-
ous sections further argued that the firm’s policy preferences are related to
its political identity. Without a basic understanding of its role toward the
policy process it is not possible for the firm to recognize preferred ways to
realize opportunities associated to political action. This means that institu-
tional features of its environment structure the way in which the firm under-
stands its role toward the policy process and condition the way in which the
firm perceives feasible options associated to political action. This concep-
tual argument leads to a number of further questions for comparative empir-
ical research into the institutional embeddedness of the political activities
of business firms and the development of these activities over time.
The first question that follows from the analysis in this article is how
corporate political identities form, change, and possibly wane again. This is
a fundamental question of corporate political action research; and in trying
to answer it, this article argues, we can benefit from integrating concepts from
social identity theory into our explanatory models. This can help us to under-
stand why it is that some firms learn to see opportunities to realize compet-
itive advantage through political action where others do not. Understanding
processes of identity and preference formation will also help us to recognize
the dynamics behind the differentiation of firms’ political behavior. The use
of concepts such as social identity, group identification, and, for instance,
identity maintenance strategies (Brown, 2000) will enable us to raise
research questions about processes of growth and the socialization of firms
within the rules of interaction held within different policy networks and
communities.
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The second basic question following from this article’s development of
the concepts of political identity and policy preference concerns processes of
identification within the firm. Perceiving the firm as a network of interaction
between organization members points to the importance of organizational
culture and routines in the formation of corporate political strategies. The
way in which senior managers reach agreement about what are feasible
strategies to realize opportunities associated to political action itself is a
political process, taking place within managerial decision making (Fligstein,
2001). This means that firms can differ in terms of the congruence between
their internal operations and, on the other hand, processes of public decision
making by political authorities and government agencies. This allows us to
integrate questions of internal differentiation and the existence of multiple
identities within the firm into corporate political action research.
This broadens the scope of corporate political action research because it
connects the notion of acting—the active process of corporate political
strategizing—with that of being a corporate political actor, trying to realize
influence on public decision making. This raises research questions about
the relevance of leadership styles and career paths and the educational and
professional background of the firm’s senior managers (cf. Hillman & Keim,
1995, p. 212). One such question, for instance, is whether public affairs
managers display “more corporate citizenship and compliance” (Haslam
et al., 2003, p. 361) when their work is more valued within the firm. This
would arguably be the case in firms with a strong sense of political identity.
Another question is what the conditions are under which managerial identi-
fication leads to innovativeness in using and combining political strategies
and tactics. Do firms that develop innovative combinations of political activ-
ities display certain identity and preference characteristics?
Third, the argument of this article gives rise to the question of the for-
mation of firms’ policy preferences, underlying corporate political strate-
gizing. In determining what their corporate interests are, firms develop
preferences for certain public policies (Martin, 2002). Firms also develop
ideas about preferred ways to try and influence these policies. The process
by which policy preferences are formed, however, has not been the topic
of corporate political action research. There is not much known about
how factors such as hierarchy and leadership, knowledge and information
exchanges, and the adjustment between the firm’s strategies and the activi-
ties of its rivals condition the way policy preferences are shaped. The
dynamics of policy preference formation hence is not very well understood.
Yet differences in the development of preferred ways of handling public
affairs and political questions can explain why some firms rather than others
think it is in their particular interest to develop into political actors. Policy
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preference formation, therefore, constitutes a central yet underdeveloped
problem of corporate political action research.
Conclusion
This article argued that corporate actors can only become politically
active based on some form of self-understanding of their role toward the pol-
icy process and, second, by being able to recognize preferred ways to real-
ize opportunities associated to political action. The firm’s self-understanding
and its strategic assessment of opportunities associated to political action, its
political identity and policy preferences, drive corporate political strategiz-
ing. This means that different processes of identity building and preference
formation across firms explain empirical variation in corporate political
behavior. Thus, the article argued that corporate political action is condi-
tioned by institutional characteristics of political environments and structured
by the organization of strategic decision making within the firm. Corporate
political identities and policy preferences are molded by the external envi-
ronment of the firm, internalized within its operations, and expressed in cor-
porate political behavior. Identities and preferences thus constitute two basic
categories in the analysis of corporate political strategizing.
Notes
1. This was also observed by Pfeffer & Salancik (1978, p. 74), who argued that key deci-
sion makers within organizations have different social and informational resources at their dis-
posal and, therefore, are likely to orient their managerial work to varying goals and priorities.
2. To date, there are not many studies available that explicitly focus on the development of
corporate political action over time. A notable exception is the work of Skippari (2005) who
provided a unique longitudinal analysis of the evolution of a firm’s political strategizing.
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